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Paving a New Way to Read Gramsci 
 
Takahiro Chino 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Gramsci’s Pathways by Guido Liguori, a leading Gramsci scholar, 
who has edited books and published numerous important mono-
graphs, articles and chapters in books, is a pleasing addition to the 
literature on Gramsci. It is a translation of his Sentieri gramsciani, 
with the Preface to the English Edition and two new chapters, 
Chapters Four and Fourteen, that did not appear in the original 
version in Italian. In total it has fourteen chapters, half of them 
being dedicated to the rigorous philological hermeneutic reading of 
Gramsci. The other half is where he relates Gramsci to those who 
influenced Gramsci and who are influenced by Gramsci. It provides 
us not only with a landscape of Gramsci’s theoretical developments 
in the Prison Notebooks, but also shows how Gramsci learnt from his 
forerunners in elaborating them and how they have been appro-
priated by later thinkers. As such, the examinations by the promin-
ent scholar in this book range from well-known ideas of Gramsci 
such as the state, civil society, and party to the intellectual history of 
Gramscian ideas such as hegemony, pragmatism, and ideology.  
As this short review of such an absorbing book cannot do justice 
to all aspects of it, I will limit myself and deliberately focus on some 
chapters that exemplify the hermeneutic analysis of Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks. For Liguori’s hermeneutic method contains important 
suggestions for the long-discussed question of how we can read the 
Prison Notebooks, which I believe the readers of Gramsci cannot 
avoid asking. In my view, the key terms in Liguori’s analysis are the 
“extended state” and “common sense”. While the extended state 
involves many of Gramsci’s core ideas such as state, civil society, 
party, movements and hegemony, common sense is closely related 
to ideology, conception of the world, good sense, and conformism. 
As these two key concepts seem to anchor Liguori’s thoughtful 
discussions about Gramsci, I will look at Liguori’s analysis of them 
respectively. In the final section, I will make a few remarks on how 
to further develop Liguori’s proposed approach of going back to 
Gramsci’s texts.  
 
International Gramsci Journal No. 9 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) December /Dicembre 2018  
 
 
105 
 
Before starting the body of my review, I need to mention one 
more aspect: its methodological closeness with the monumental 
work Dizionario gramsciano 1926-1937 of 2009, edited by Liguori and 
Pasquale Voza.1 As written in the Preface to Gramsci’s Pathways, 
Liguori’s motives for editing the Dizionario seem closely connected 
to those of writing Pathways. When starting seminars for the 
Dizionario in 2001, according to him,  
 
[w]e started out from the conviction that it is today possible to read 
Gramsci as a great contemporary author – not a politically neutral one, but 
neither one who can immediately be compressed into present-day political 
debates. Hence the belief that now we need to “go back to the texts”, to “his” 
texts, after years and years of interpretations that had built up a long and 
sometimes fruitful – but now useless – “battle of ideas” on top of them (p. IX). 
 
As this principle seems to straddle both the Dizionario and 
Pathways, it would be helpful for us to quickly summarize the two 
following important characteristics of the Dizionario in order to 
grasp the shared principle. First, the Dizionario instantiates how 
Gramsci defined and used his ideas throughout the Notebooks, 
providing us with a landscape of how Gramsci himself employs a 
contested idea, such as hegemony. This enables us to narrow down 
the possible intended meanings of his ideas, while avoiding 
excessively extending meanings beyond Gramsci’s writings. Second, 
the Dizionario illustrates how Gramsci’s ideas are not mechanically 
distinct, but organically interrelated to one another. It helps us 
understand how throughout the years the web of his ideas, such as 
the relationship between state and civil society, were developed in 
the Notebooks.  
As I will examine below, we can observe that Gramsci’s Pathways 
shares these two characteristics with the Dizionario and provides a 
deeper analysis of the Notebooks through Liguori’s hermeneutic 
approach. 
 
2. The Extended State 
The first uniqueness I deliberately picked up from Gramsci’s Path-
ways is found in Chapter 2. It resides in its focus on the “extended 
State” as a key phrase in understanding Gramsci’s complex, and 
“organic”, relationship between the State and the economy, and 
                                                 
1 Liguori and Voza 2009.  
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between the State and civil society. It is well known that Gramsci 
complained about the common understanding of the State as a 
mere organ of violence.2 According to Liguori, Gramsci refined the 
concept of the State to encompass two characteristic traits of early-
twentieth-century States.  
The first “extension” of the State can be seen in the new relation-
ship between the State and economy. This is intriguing as it is 
relatively little discussed in comparison with the second extension. 
States originally separated politics from economics, yet a new 
relationship between the two terrains emerged in his time. As 
observed in the cases of Italy, Soviet Russia, and the United States 
after the crisis of 1929, the State had started to intervene in the 
economy. Gramsci analyzed that the State had to assume the 
important role of guaranteeing savings and organizing production, 
which previously the bourgeoisie controlled according to its private 
initiative, after observing the Great Crash of 1929 and the market’s 
failure regarding self-regulation.3 
However, Liguori quickly adds, Gramsci did not jettison the 
Marxist assumption of the State as the expression of the economic 
situation. Gramsci’s civil society is commonly understood as a part 
of the superstructure, together with political society (the State as 
violence), and a site for producing people’s consent to the existing 
governance. Yet, it should be noted, as Liguori emphasizes, that – 
albeit rarely – Gramsci argued that civil society and the economy 
could be closely connected with the State, acting as the bond:  
 
between economic structure and the State with its legislation and coercion 
stands civil society [...]; the State is the instrument of the adequation of civil 
society to the economic structure.4 
 
As Liguori points out, however, Gramsci did not endorse, on the 
one hand, Fascist corporativism due to its plutocratic character and 
                                                 
2 Q15§10, p. 1765; Selections from the Prison Notebooks (hereafter SPN), p. 244. Following 
convention, quotations from the Quaderni del carcere (Prison Notebooks) are shown by notebook 
number (Q), passage number (§) and page number. Where English translations are available 
from Gramsci’s Pathways and direct quotations are required, I make use of them. Where neither, 
I quote from English translations of the Prison Notebooks. 
3 Q22§14, pp. 2175-8; SPN, pp. 313-6. 
4 Q10II§15, p. 1253. The quoted translation is from Liguori (2015, p. 7); [cf. Further Selections 
from the Prison Notebooks, 1995 {hereafter FSPN}, p. 167, esp. “the State is the instrument for 
bringing civil society into line with the economic structure”- editorial note]. 
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the finance capital behind it, or New Deal policies as they preserve 
the class character and exploitation of capitalism (p. 6). Hence, 
State intervention in the economy does not mean the State’s 
takeover of the economic base. The thrust of Gramsci’s argument, 
according to Liguori, is that “it is certain that the state as such does 
not produce but is the expression of the economic situation”.5 
While Liguori admits that the theoretical importance of Gramsci 
lies in his articulations of the superstructural elements, he stresses 
that Gramsci’s arguments firmly rested on the Marxist assumption 
of the determining role of the economic base. This emphasis by 
Liguori urges us to pay particular (and further) attention to 
Gramsci’s economic theory at large. 
The second extension of the State regards the relationship 
between political society and civil society. As I noted earlier, 
Gramsci complained about the common view of the State in a 
narrow sense as violence, as political society in his term. Rather, 
modern States, in which democracy holds sway, exercise their 
governance by obtaining people’s consent to its existing form. It is 
important for the governing to make people believe that their needs 
are somewhat reflected in the policies of the government. Such 
consent is produced in civil society, via private institutions such as 
the media and the church that influence people’s opinions and 
views of the world in their daily life. Given this, Gramsci stressed 
the importance of civil society for modern states: “[…] over its 
historical development belongs to private forces, to civil society – 
which is ‘State’ too, indeed is the State itself”.6 He thus redefined 
the state in the very relationship between coercion deriving from 
political society and consent from civil society. 
Gramsci portrayed modern States characterized by the relation-
ship between the two as the “integral State”. In comprehending 
Gramsci’s arguments about the relationship, Liguori aptly focuses 
on that term. As Liguori points out, Q6§10 reads “after the French 
Revolution the bourgeoisie ‘could present itself as an integral 
«State», with all the sufficient intellectual and moral forces needed 
to organize a complete and perfect society’”.7 Also, in Q6§155, “In 
politics the error occurs as a result of an inaccurate understanding 
                                                 
5 Q10II§41vi, p. 1310: Liguori (2015, p. 3); [FSPN, p. 427]. 
6 Q26§6, p. 2302; SPN, p. 261. 
7 Q6§10, p. 691. The quoted translation is from Liguori (2015, p. 16); [cf. the slightly 
different wording in SPN, p. 271 and in Gramsci 2007, p. 9]. 
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of what the State (in its integral meaning: dictatorship + hegemony) 
really is?”.8 As seen in these parentheses, Gramsci called 
contemporary States that unify coercion and consent (i.e., political 
society and civil society) the “integral State”. 
I agree with Liguori in stressing the importance of Gramsci’s ex-
tension of the concept of the State, which has been not fully ex-
plored. It was Buci-Glucksmann’s monumental work Gramsci and the 
State of 1975 (translated into Italian in 1976 and into English in 1980) 
that first provided a theoretical analysis of Gramsci’s idea of the 
integral State.9 Her book is still influential in the Anglophone con-
text. In my view, Liguori and Buci-Glucksmann have offered signif-
icantly different views of it in terms of the controversial issue of the 
role of the economic base in Gramsci. This is related to what Liguori 
calls the first extension that Gramsci’s extended State provided.  
Before looking at their differences, let us begin by examining 
what they agree on as the characteristics of the extended State. In a 
word, they generally agree on what Liguori calls the second 
extension (p. 8). They agree that Gramsci revised and updated the 
concept of the State to account for the growing tendency of 
governance relying on the people’s consent. In other words, they 
agree that Gramsci’s extended State is based on his methodological 
arrangement, as an ideal type, to divide political society, or the State 
as violence, from civil society, the site of people’s consent. The 
extended State thus appears as a remedy to the existing, yet 
outdated and narrow, understanding of the State that exclusively 
possesses coercive forces. In this sense, they also agree that 
Gramsci anticipated the emergence of “regulated society” at the 
end of the growing impact of consent on governance, when the 
elements of coercion become obsolete and thus disappear. 
What they might disagree can be found in their differing under-
standings of how Gramsci incorporated the role of the economy in 
this revised view of the State. Crucially, their difference here centres 
on their views about whether in Gramsci’s Marxism the super-
structure is dependent on the economy or not. Liguori emphasizes 
how the extended State embodied Gramsci’s Marxist conviction 
that the economy is the ultimate foundation of the superstructure, 
                                                 
8 Q6§155, pp. 810-11. The quoted translation is from Liguori (2015, p. 17); [see SPN, p. 239 
or Gramsci 2007, p. 117]. 
9 Buci-Glucksmann (1980). 
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including both political and civil societies. According to him, the 
extended State exhibits Gramsci’s view that the State is the express-
ion of the economy, namely the State broadens its functions by 
intervening the economy rather than maintaining laisser-faire, 
especially after the Great Depression of 1929. To address this topic, 
let us look at two arguments propounded by Liguori. First, he points 
out that in the Notebooks there are cases where civil society signifies 
economic society, apart from its major meaning as a site of private 
institutions and thus of consent. A prime example of this is a 
passage that I quoted earlier:  
 
[b]etween the economic structure and the State with its legislation and 
coercion stands civil society [...] the State is the instrument of the adequation of 
civil society to the economic structure.10  
 
Liguori’s quotation ends here, but an important argument could 
be found right after this:  
 
but the state has to “want” to do that, i.e., the representatives of the change 
that has already come about in the economic structure have to be in control of 
the State.11  
 
Another example demonstrates how the State has to act in order 
to prevent another depression in the “‘Keynesian’ phase” of the 
capitalist economy. It does so by rationalizing production, by 
guaranteeing savings, and by making up for industrial losses and 
deficits (p. 5).12 Gramsci’s State here works to alter the contents of 
civil society so that it fits with a new type of economy. It is thus 
natural to interpret that Gramsci emphasized the relationship 
between the economy and the State as being closer than that 
between the superstructural elements, the State and civil society. By 
this argument Liguori underpins his view that, within the Marxist 
scheme Gramsci upheld, the State cooperates in the emergence of a 
new economic structure, being neither dependent on the economic 
conditions nor led under the consent produced in civil society.  
                                                 
10 Q10II§15: 1253. The quoted translation is from Liguori (2015, p. 7); [cf. FSPN, p. 167]. 
11 Q10II§15: 1253-4; [cf. FSPN, loc. cit.]. 
12 See Q9§8, p. 1101 [first draft or “A text”]: and Q22§14 [second draft or “C text”], p. 2176 
[SPN, pp. 313-6, esp. p. 315]. 
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On the contrary, Buci-Glucksmann offers a view that Gramsci’s 
extended State does not intervene in the economy as much as 
Liguori assumes. It should be noted that she agrees with Liguori 
about the elements of consent in the “extended” State. Yet, she 
seems not to understand State intervention in the economy as a 
major characteristic of Gramsci’s extended State, as Liguori does. 
Chapters 3 and 14 of her book emphasize that Gramsci’s extended 
State is a refined Leninist idea that prepares for the withering away 
of the State by reinforcing the function of consent, namely, of 
autonomous governance by the people themselves. In this sense, 
she limits her discussion within the framework that Gramsci 
developed in a famous argument: the extended State is established 
by both coercion and consent, yet the elements of coercion 
gradually disappear, as those of consent become predominant.13 
Hence, Liguori and Buci-Glucksmann do not illustrate Gramsci’s 
extended State in entirely the same way: Liguori’s focus on the 
relationship between the State and the economy is missing in Buci-
Glucksmann’s version. It would be beneficial for readers if Liguori 
could further clarify how his and Buci-Glucksmann’s understand-
ings differ, and what would be the wider implication of focusing on 
the connection between the State and the economy as a character-
istic of the extended State, in particular in relation to the withering-
away thesis that Buci-Glucksmann emphasizes. 
 
3. Common Sense  
Common sense is another important and extensively discussed 
idea of Gramsci’s. Chapter 6 of Pathways challenges a major under-
standing of it. This interpretation appreciates people’s common 
sense as a reflection of truth against the established philosophy of 
intellectuals, who claims to exclusively possess truth. In this view, 
Gramsci’s common sense is understood in a positive way, 
advocating the alteration of power relations underlying the existing 
relationship between the philosophy of intellectuals and the 
common sense of the masses. 
Given this positive understanding of common sense, Liguori 
begins by unpacking how Gramsci used the terms of “common 
sense” and “good sense”, respectively. According to him, Gramsci’s 
common sense falls into the following three meanings. First, 
                                                 
13 Q6§88, p. 763-4, SPN, pp. 262-3 [cf. Gramsci 2007, p. 75]; Buci-Glucksmann (1980, p. 282). 
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Liguori emphasizes that Gramsci generally used the term common 
sense in a negative way (pp. 90-3; p. 106; p. 111). Second, Gramsci 
employed it in a descriptive way as a synonym of “culture” or “con-
ception of the world” (p. 88). And third, Gramsci also referred to it 
as a synonym for good sense in a neutral or positive way (p. 103; p. 
109). Liguori then goes on to look at three meanings that Gramsci 
gave to good sense. The first meaning is a synonym for the third 
meaning of common sense (p. 103; p. 109). Second, it signifies “cul-
ture” or the “conception of the world”, as does the second meaning 
of common sense (p. 110). The third meaning differentiates good 
sense from common sense, denoting a better understanding of the 
world than the common sense that confusingly entails the residues 
of past philosophies and religions (p. 107).  
Liguori’s summary is intriguing in that it underscores the 
negative meaning of common sense, and that, at the same time, it 
sheds light on good sense as a better understanding of the world 
(pp. 108-9). It seems, however, that Liguori might not have fully 
explained the relationship between common sense (which is 
generally negative) and good sense (which is generally positive). 
From my perspective, in Gramsci, it seems not contradictory to 
look at the generally negative connotation of common sense, and 
still observe possible elements of good sense in it. They could be 
compatible. The point is, just as Aristotle did not abandon people’s 
opinions as nonsense, but rather considered that they may contain 
some truth, Gramsci also did not jettison common sense, but 
regarded common sense as an unsorted view that includes a real 
understanding of the world. Gramsci argued that good sense is the 
people’s equivalent to philosophy as an ordered perception of the 
world, while common sense itself cannot be so. 
 
Philosophy is intellectual order, which neither religion nor common sense 
can be. [...] Moreover common sense is a collective noun, like religion: there is 
not just one common sense, for that too is a product of history and a part of the 
historical process. Philosophy is criticism and the superseding of religion and 
“common sense”. In this sense it coincides with “good” as opposed to “common” sense.14 
 
Liguori quotes this passage (p. 104), but omits the important sen-
tence that I have emphasized above where Gramsci contrasts good 
                                                 
14 Q11§12, p. 1378; SPN, pp. 325-6, emphasis by TC. 
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sense as people’s organized understanding of the world with com-
mon sense and religion as their disorganized perception. 
Therefore, Gramsci argued that appreciating good sense as 
“intellectual order” does not contradict comprehending common 
sense itself in a negative way. It could be more helpful for readers if 
Liguori discussed rather more closely how his general argument 
that Gramsci’s common sense at large has a negative connotation is 
consistent with his interpretation of Gramsci’s appreciation of good 
sense. All in all, however, Liguori’s stress on the negative connot-
ation of common sense works as a strong corrective to the existing 
literature that has read it in a more positive way.  
 
4. Further Methodological Inquiry Required? 
Before concluding this short piece, I would like to provide a tiny 
reflection on Liguori’s proposed method to “go back to Gramsci’s 
texts”, which I agree with as a doubtlessly welcome trend. As 
Gramsci’s Pathways exemplifies, this approach is a helpful way to 
disentangle still-cryptic texts of the Prison Notebooks by revealing the 
chronological and logical development of Gramsci’s thought 
throughout his years of writing in prison. Observing the textual 
development from the A texts to C texts, for instance, tells us how 
he revised his original notes, and how he elaborated the ensemble 
of his thought, which cannot be reduced a simple textual reading of 
some keywords. In this sense, this approach helps us better recon-
struct what Gramsci was thinking throughout his writing of the 
entire Notebooks. Along with Gramsci’s Pathways, important recent 
literature has more or less shared this approach, such as Le parole di 
Gramsci, edited by Fabio Frosini and Liguori; and Il ritmo del pensiero, 
by Giuseppe Cospito, to note only two.15 
However, I think we are only halfway to the goal of “going back 
to Gramsci’s texts”. Gramsci’s Pathways demonstrates how to do so, 
yet it does not fully provide us with a proper and solid method-
ology that materializes this proposal. A philological approach itself, 
mostly developed by Italian scholars, does not necessarily tell us 
how ought we to read Gramsci. It is still possible to collect passages 
from Gramsci to say what we are programmed to say. As this issue 
of how to read thinkers’ texts has been one of the most discussed 
problems in the history of ideas, we might be able to identify from 
                                                 
15 Frosini and Liguori (2004); Cospito (2011) [in English Cospito 2016]. 
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such discussion of this problem in general some possible candidates 
who could help us develop our reading of Gramsci. Here I would 
like to limit myself to introducing ideas proposed by Leo Strauss 
and Quentin Skinner, and how they would help us in further 
promoting Liguori’s project of going back to Gramsci’s texts. 
First, let me explore Strauss’s approach that focuses on “literary 
character” of texts. Leo Strauss was a Jewish political philosopher 
born in Germany, and is well known for his career as a professor at 
the University of Chicago. In his Persecution and the Art of Writing, he 
points out that great books have their own “literary character”, 
depending on the difference in the way in which they may be read, 
something that readers must understand before interpreting them.16 
Looking at Gramsci’s Notebooks from this perspective, we can see 
they have their own literary character, which is distinct, for 
example, from Croce’s books, which he continued to revise 
throughout his lifetime. We may be able to point out two literary 
characters proper to Gramsci’s Notebooks. First, the Prison Notebooks, 
as implied in Liguori’s approach, are left as a collection of his notes, 
unedited after the author’s death, even though they have since 
received different levels of editing. Second, stemming from the 
first, they have a “private” character: Gramsci never considered 
publishing them as they are.17 As they are written as Gramsci’s 
private notebooks, they often lack the contexts that would enable 
us to grasp in what sense Gramsci referred to his ideas. When we 
write something publicly, we more or less try to translate what we 
think into a publicly acceptable forms and languages, in order to 
reach a wider audience. Through this process, written texts go 
beyond the shared beliefs, languages, and customs of close friends 
and colleagues. However, the Prison Notebooks are considerably 
lacking in such a process of translation, due to his death and also to 
the political situation in which, elucidating what he wrote in his 
notebooks, would put his family in Russia under danger of 
persecution. 
Of course, the Notebooks have a surprising degree of logical 
coherence in terms of their selected topics and his arguments, 
despite the literary characters of being unedited and private. 
                                                 
16 Strauss (1988), p. 30. 
17 See, Gramsci’s project of writing an Anti-Croce based on his notes from Notebook 10 
(Q10I§11, QdC p. 1234 [FSPN, pp. 354-6]; Q8, QdC p. 935 [PN Vol. 3, p. 231]).  
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However, seeking logical coherence alone cannot be a satisfactory 
criterion for reading them, as we can draw it convincingly from the 
Notebooks in various ways, depending on how we are programmed 
to read Gramsci – even by attributing to him views that he might 
not hold. If my analysis of these two literary characteristics of the 
Prison Notebooks is appropriate, then what would be a relevant way 
to accommodate them in order to better interpret Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks? My suggestion is a method proposed by Quentin 
Skinner, a British intellectual historian, as Skinner’s approach limits 
the possible ways in which they can be read, by rejecting logically 
possible yet contextually impossible readings.  
Let me examine here how Skinner’s approach is useful in reading 
Gramsci. Skinner emphasizes the importance of seeking what the 
thinker’s “intention in doing something” was,18 for they might have 
failed to do what they originally intended to do. In the case of 
Gramsci’s Notebooks, as I noted earlier, he did not intend to publish 
them in the form we have them now. We tend to look into the 
Notebooks retrospectively, more or less presupposing that his origin-
al intentions are included in his achievements. Yet, as Skinner 
claims, we cannot derive Gramsci’s intentions from his 
achievements. Let me look at an example from Gramsci’s first plan 
of the Notebooks, expressed in a letter to Tat’jana Schucht, on 19 
March 1927. Typically, his famous phrase to “do something für 
ewig” in the Notebooks has often been interpreted as his 
announcement of launching the project of establishing a 
monumental achievement. Yet, the four topics he juxtaposed in the 
letter are more down-to-earth. For instance, his interest in 
linguistics – nothing “could be more ‘disinterested’ and ‘für ewig’ 
than that”19 – suggests that he intended to examine how the Italian 
language took part in constructing the ruling class’s hegemony, 
although he could not explore this topic thoroughly. By looking at 
his plan in the letter as well as later plans in Notebooks 1 and 8, we 
can discount the strong reading of the phrase für ewig as a plan to 
seek something eternal or true. 
On the contrary, by focusing on his intention to choose those 
“interrelated” themes, we can see that he wished to pursue the topic 
of Italian intellectuals – the topic he developed in his last pre-prison 
                                                 
18 Skinner (1988), p. 65. 
19 Gramsci (1965), p. 58; Gramsci (1994a), pp. 83-4. 
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article, Alcuni temi della quistione meridionale 20 – and that of the 
masses, a part of which was discussed in the “Notes” as its main 
topic about the Italian peasantry.21 As Liguori suggests (p. 23; p. 
91), Gramsci’s proposed way of reading Marx could be applicable 
to the research of Gramsci himself:  
 
It is necessary, first of all, to reconstruct the process of intellectual 
development of the thinker in question in order to identify those elements 
which were to become stable and ‘permanent.’ [...] Research for the Leitmotif, 
for the rhythm of thought as it develops, should be more important than that 
for single causal affirmations and isolated aphorisms.22  
 
To sum up, Strauss urges us to explore texts according to their 
literary characters, which are those of being unedited and private in 
the case of the Prison Notebooks. In dealing with these problems, 
Skinner’s approach urges us to reconstruct the author’s motive in 
writing them, by analyzing the discourse in which Gramsci was 
situated and the terms and ideas which were available for him when 
writing the Notebooks. I think these two ways would be also bene-
ficial for Gramsci scholars if we try to “go back to Gramsci’s texts” 
following Liguori. Gramsci’s Pathways provides English-language 
readers with the prime example of this fruitful approach in Italian 
scholarship. All in all, as along with other books from the Historical 
Materialism series, this is a welcome addition to the new generation 
of Gramsci literature.  
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